With a rapid growth of data storage in the cloud, data integrity checking in a remote data storage system has become an important issue. A number of protocols, which allow remote integrity checking by a third party, have been proposed. Although those protocols are provably secure, the data privacy issues in those protocols have not been considered. We believe that these issues are equally important since the communication flows of integrity proofs from the cloud server should not reveal any useful information of the stored data. In this paper, we introduce a new definition of data privacy called 'INDPrivacy' by an indistinguishability game. It is found that many existing remote integrity proofs are insecure under an IND-Privacy game. It is also found that by adopting witness indistinguishable proofs, the IND-Privacy is achievable. We provide an instantiation that captures data integrity, soundness and IND-privacy.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing offers different types of computational services to end users via computer networks. It has demonstrated a long list of advantages. It is becoming a trend that individuals and IT enterprises store data remotely to the cloud in a flexible on-demand manner, which has become a popular way of data outsourcing. This has reduced the burden for storage management and maintenances and costs on hardware and software, with great advancement of universal data access and convenience to users. In fact, cloud storage has become one of the major services in cloud computing where users' data are stored and maintained by cloud servers. It allows users to access their data via computer networks at anytime and from anywhere.
Despite the great benefits provided by cloud storage, data security is a very important but challenging problem that must be solved. One of the major concerns of data security is data integrity in a remote storage system [1, 2] . Although storing data in the cloud is attractive, it does not usually offer any guarantee on data integrity and retrievability. Simple data integrity checking in a remote data storage can be done by periodically examining the data files stored on the cloud server, but such an approach can be very expensive if the amount of data is huge. An interesting problem is to check data integrity remotely without the need of accessing the full copy of data stored on the cloud server. For example, the data owner possesses some verification token (e.g. a digest of the data file [3, 4] ), which is very small compared with the stored dataset. However, a number of security issues have been found in previous research [5] [6] [7] . Several techniques, such as proof of retrievability (POR) [8, 9] and third party auditing [7, 10, 11] , have been proposed to solve the above data integrity checking problem with public auditability. POR is loosely speaking a kind of proof of knowledge [12] where the knowledge is the data file, while third party auditing allows any third party auditor (TPA) to perform the data integrity checking on behalf of the data owner based on some public information (e.g. the data owner's public key). Several schemes with public auditability have been proposed in the context of ensuring remotely stored data integrity under different system and security models [7] [8] [9] 13] .
It is important that an auditing process should not introduce new vulnerabilities of unauthorized information leakage towards their data security [14] . The previous efforts in remote integrity checking (RIC) accommodate several security features including data integrity and confidentiality, which mainly ensure secure maintenance of data. However, they do not cover 824 X. Fan et al.
the issue of data privacy, which means that the communication flows (RIC proofs) from the cloud server should not reveal any useful information to the adversary including the TPA. By 'privacy', we mean that an adversary should not be able to distinguish which file has been uploaded by the client to the cloud server. We refer it as Indistinguishability (IND). We believe that it is very important to consider such privacy issues adequately in protocol designs. Taking some existing TPAbased RIC proofs [6, 7, 11] as an example, the proof sent by the cloud server to the auditor does not allow the auditor to recover the file, but the auditor can still distinguish which file (among a set of possible files) is involved in the RIC proof, which is clearly undesirable.
Intuitively, in an IND-Privacy game, the adversaries including the TPA should not be able to distinguish which file stored in the cloud is checked, where the cloud server acts as the RIC prover. That is, given two file instances F 0 and F 1 , the RIC proof tokens T (F i ) for i ∈ {0, 1} from the cloud server should not be distinguishable to the adversary, where T is some proof function. Note that encryption does not provide the INDPrivacy, even if the encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure. The reason is simple. Assume that both F 0 and F 1 are encrypted and their corresponding ciphertexts are C 0 and C 1 , which will be checked by the adversary (TPA). The RIC proof token from the cloud server (the challenger) now becomes T (C i ) for i ∈ {0, 1}. If the adversary can win the IND-privacy game, he will know which ciphertext has been checked. This is against the INDPrivacy, since the stored content should be indistinguishable to the adversary, no matter if it is encrypted or unencrypted. If C 0 and C 1 stored in a public cloud storage belong to different users, then the adversary might be able to distinguish the file owners, provided the adversary wins the IND-Privacy game.
In this paper, we propose an indistinguishability-based definition of data privacy, i.e., IND-Privacy, for TPA-based RIC protocols. We show that two recently published RIC schemes [7, 11] are insecure under our new definition and some information about the user file is leaked in these RIC proofs. We then provide a new RIC construction to demonstrate how IND-privacy can be achieved. We show that by applying the witness indistinguishability proof technique [15] , we are able to achieve IND-privacy in RIC protocols. To the best of our knowledge, our RIC construction is the first scheme that can achieve IND-privacy.
Paper organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the security model and definition of data privacy for RIC proofs. In Section 3, we analyze the RIC protocols by Wang et al. and show why their RIC protocols fail to capture IND-Privacy. In Section 4, we demonstrate how IND-Privacy can be achieved with a witness indistinguishability proof. We also provide the definition of soundness for RIC proofs and show the soundness of our protocol based on witness indistinguishability proof. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
DEFINITIONS AND SECURITY MODEL
RIC Protocols. We will focus on TPA-based RIC protocols for cloud data storage systems. The protocol involves three entities: the cloud server, the cloud user and the TPA. The cloud user relies on the cloud server to store and maintain his/her data. Since the user no longer keeps the data locally, it is of critical importance for the user to ensure that the data are correctly stored and maintained by the cloud server. In order to avoid periodically data integrity verification, the user will resort to a TPA for checking the integrity of his/her outsourced data. To be precise, an RIC protocol for cloud storage consists of five algorithms: RIC IND-Privacy. We define the privacy for RIC proofs via an indistinguishability game between a simulator S (i.e. the cloud server or prover) and an adversary A (i.e. the auditor or verifier).
Setup:
The simulator runs KeyGen to generate (sk, pk) and passes pk to the adversary A.
Phase 1:
A is allowed to make Token Generation queries. To make such a query, A selects a file F and sends it to S. S generates a file tag t, authenticators σ and then returns (t, σ ) to A. 
|.
1 In the RIC protocols presented in this paper, the file F is divided into multiple data blocks, and the authenticator σ for F is in fact a set of authenticators for individual data blocks. 
The

INDISTINGUISHABILITY ANALYSIS OF EXISTING RIC PROTOCOLS
Notation and preliminaries
Before describing some existing RIC protocols, we first introduce some notation and tools used in those protocols. We denote F the data file to be stored in the cloud. It is decomposed as a sequence of n blocks m 1 , . . . , m n ∈ Z p for some large prime p. We denote by H (·) and h(·) cryptographic hash functions. Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g 1 and g be generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. A bilinear map is a map e : u, v) ab . Also, the map e must be efficiently computable and nondegenerate (i.e. e(g 1 , g) = 1). In addition, let ψ denote an efficiently computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 , with ψ(g) = g 1 [16] .
IND-privacy of an RIC protocol
Wang et al. [7] presented an RIC protocol based on Merkle hash tree (MHT) [17] . Their protocol works as follows.
Setup Phase:
The cloud user generates the keys and authentication tokens for the files as follows.
KeyGen: The cloud user runs KeyGen to generate the public and private key pair. Specifically, the user generates a random verification and signing key pair (spk, ssk) of a digital signature scheme, and set the public key pk = (v, spk) and sk = (x, ssk), where x is randomly chosen from Z p and v = g x .
TokenGen: Given a file F = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n ), the cloud user chooses a file name name, a random element u ∈ G 1 and calculates the file tag t = name n u SSig ssk (name n u),
where H is a cryptographic hash function modeled as a random oracle. The client then generates a root R based on the construction of Merkle hash tree (MHT) where the leave nodes of the tree are an ordered set of hash values H (m i ) (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). The cloud user then signs the root R under the private key x:
x and sends {F, t, {σ i }, sig sk (H (R))} to the cloud server.
Auditing Phase: The TPA first obtains the file tag t and verifies the signature SSig ssk (name n u) using spk. If the verification is successful, the TPA obtains name and u.
Challenge: To generate chal, TPA picks a random subset I = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s c } of set [1, n] , where s 1 ≤ · · · ≤ s c . Then, the TPA sends a challenge chal = {i, ν i } i∈I to the cloud server where ν i is randomly selected from Z p .
Response: Upon receiving the challenge chal = {i, ν i } i∈I , the cloud server computes μ = i∈I ν i m i and σ = i∈I σ ν i i . The cloud server will also provide the verifier with a small amount of auxiliary information { i } i∈I , which are the node siblings on the path from the leaves H (m i ) i∈I to the root R of the MHT. The server sends the proof P = {μ, σ, {H (m i ), i } i∈I , sig sk (H (R))} to the TPA.
Verify: Upon receiving the responses from the cloud server, the TPA generates the root R using {H (m i ), i } i∈I , and authenticates it by checking e(sig sk 
(H (R)), g) = e(H (R), v).
If the authentication fails, the verifier rejects by emitting FALSE. Otherwise, the verifier checks
If the equation holds, output True; otherwise, output False.
Indistinguishability analysis
It is easy to see that the above RIC protocol does not provide the IND-Privacy. Let A denote an IND adversary which works as follows (also see Fig. 2 ):
n ) and
i }, sig sk (H (R (1) ))) for F 0 and F 1 , respectively. S then chooses a random b ∈ {0, 1} and sends t b back to A. (iii) A chooses a random challenge chal = {i, ν i } i∈I .
(iv) S computes and sends to A the response Probability analysis. It is easy to see that A has an overwhelming probability to guess the value of b correctly since the probability that
is negligible since the hash function is assumed to be a random oracle in [7] .
IND-privacy of another privacy preserving RIC protocol
Wang et al. [11] introduced a new RIC protocol. Compared with the RIC protocol presented above, this new protocol aims to achieve the additional property of privacy preserving (i.e. the TPA cannot learn the content of the file in the auditing process).
, H, h) be the system parameters as introduced above. Wang et al.'s privacy-preserving public auditing scheme works as follows (also see Fig. 3 
):
Setup Phase: KeyGen: The cloud user runs KeyGen to generate the public and private key pair. Specifically, the user generates a random verification and signing key pair (spk, ssk) of a digital signature scheme, a random x ← Z p , a random element u ← G 1 , and computes v ← g x . The user's secret key is sk = (x, ssk) and public key is pk = (spk, v, u). where SSig ssk (name) is the user's signature on name under the signing key ssk. It was assumed that the TPA knows the number of blocks n. The user then sends F along with the verification metadata (φ, t) to the cloud server and deletes them from local storage.
Auditing Phase: The TPA first obtains the file tag t and verifies the signature SSig ssk (name) using spk. The TPA quits by emitting FALSE if the verification fails. Otherwise, the TPA recovers name.
Challenge: The TPA generates a challenge chal for the cloud server as follows: picks a random c-element subset I = {s 1 , . . . , s c } of set [1, n] , and then for each element i ∈ I , chooses a random value ν i ∈ Z p . The TPA sends chal = {(i, ν i )} i∈I to the cloud server.
Response: Upon receiving the challenge chal, the server generates a response to prove the data storage correctness. Specifically, the server chooses a random element r ← Z p , and calculates R = e (u, v) r ∈ G T . Let μ denote the linear combination of sampled blocks specified in chal: μ = i∈I ν i m i . To blind μ with r, the server computes μ = r + γ μ mod p, where γ = h(R) ∈ Z p . Meanwhile, the server also calculates an aggregated authenticator σ = i∈I σ ν i i , and sends (μ, σ, R) as the response to the TPA.
Verify: Upon receiving the response (μ, σ, R) from the cloud server, the TPA validates the response by first computing γ = h(R) and then checking the following verification equation:
The verification is successful if the equation holds.
Indistinguishability analysis
In [11] , it has been shown that the RIC proof is privacy preserving. That is, the TPA cannot recover the file F from the proof. This is done by concealing the value of μ . However, we found that such a treatment could not guarantee that there is no information leakage during the auditing process. Below we show that Wang et al.'s scheme cannot achieve indistinguishability. Let A denote an IND adversary which works as follows (also see Fig. 4 ).
n ) and If it is true, return 0; otherwise, return 1. 
which happens only with probability 1/p for randomly selected
i for all i ∈ I . Therefore, A has an overwhelming probability to guess the value of b correctly.
A NEW RIC PROTOCOL WITH IND-PRIVACY
In order to achieve the IND-privacy, we adopt the Witness Indistinguishable Proof of Knowledge technique proposed by Groth and Sahai [15] . Their method can be applied to pairing groups. Our goal is to protect both the file and the corresponding authenticators so that the adversary cannot learn any information about the file.
Similar to Wang et al.'s scheme [11] reviewed in Section 3.3, our construction is still based on the 'aggregate authenticator' introduced by Shacham and Waters [8] . That is, the cloud server will prove that the equation
holds, where μ = i∈I ν i m i and σ = i∈I σ ν i i . We will treat (u μ , σ ) as the witness when applying the Groth-Sahai proof system, and rewrite Equation (2) as follows:
In order to protect the privacy of μ (or u μ ) and σ , the user computes an additional commitment key u = (u 1 , u 2 ) of the form
where α and τ are selected from Z p at random and u is the same generator of G 1 where r i,j (i, j ∈ {1, 2}) are randomly selected from Z p . The cloud server also computes
and sends ( c, π ) as the response to the TPA. TPA then verifies the response sent by the cloud server by checking the equality of
where t T represents the right-hand side of Equation (3) and ι T denotes the following transformation:
The The '•' operation is defined as follows: define a function
, and the '•' operation is defined as
Correctness. To verify Equation (4), , 1) e(c 22 , v  −1 ) .
and we have e(c 11 , 1)e(c 21 , 
IND-privacy of our new scheme
Below we show that our new RIC protocol has the INDPrivacy under the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption [15] . Proof. Let A denote an adversary who has a non-negligible advantage in winning the IND game, we construct another algorithm B which can solve the SXDH problem also with a non-negligible probability.
B receives a challenge gk, A = u x , B = u y , C = u z where gk = (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, u, g ) and z is either xy or a random element ξ in Z p . B sets up the IND game for A as follows:
(1) B uses the information in gk to generate all the system parameters and public/private keys as described in Wang et al.'s TPA scheme (Section 3.3). (2) B also sets the values of the commitment key u = (u 1 , u 2 ) in our scheme as u 1 = (u, A) and u 2 = (B, C).
Upon receiving two files F 0 and F 1 from A and B simulates the game as follows. B generates a random file identifier name and the file tag t = name SSig ssk (name), and uses name and the secret key x to compute the authenticators {σ (0) i } (for F 0 ) and {σ (1) i } (for F 1 ) honestly. After that, B tosses a random coin b ← {0, 1}, and sends the file tag t back to A. Upon receiving the challenge chal from A, B computes μ 0 , μ 1 , and the corresponding aggregated authenticators σ (0) and σ (1) honestly. B then generates the response to A as follows.
(1) Randomly choose r 11 , r 12 , r 21 , r 22 from Z p . 
Soundness of the protocol
Having shown the IND feature of the protocol, we have seen that adversary A cannot distinguish the file that has been used by the cloud server in an RIC proof. The remaining task is to prove the 'soundness' of the protocol. We say a protocol is sound if it is infeasible for the cloud server to change a file without being caught by the TPA in an auditing process. We formally define the soundness games between a simulator B and an adversary A (i.e. the cloud server) as follows: Below we prove that our RIC protocol is sound under the co-CDH assumption. Let (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g 1 , g ) be the systems parameters defined as above where e : 
From Equations (5) and (6), we can obtain e(σ * /σ, g) = e(u μ * −μ , v).
Since B chooses the challenges ν i randomly, with overwhelming probability 1 − 1/p, μ * = i∈I ν i m * i = i∈I ν i m i = μ, and hence B can obtain 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied a new desirable security notion called IND-Privacy for remote data integrity checking protocols for cloud storage. We showed that several well-known RIC protocols cannot provide this property, which could render the privacy of user data exposed in an auditing process. We then proposed a new RIC protocol which can provide INDPrivacy. Our construction is based on an efficient Witness Indistinguishable Proof of Knowledge system. In addit ion, we also proved the soundness of the newly proposed protocol, which means the cloud server cannot modify the user data without being caught by the TPA in an auditing process.
